Many development experts worry that continuing reductions of tariff levels in highincome countries will limit trade flows from developing countries that benefit from preferential trade programs because of "preference erosion." Using a panel of U.S.
Introduction
The United States ushered in a new era in development assistance with the establishment of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program in 1976. The program, which eliminated duties on thousands of products from developing countries, was intended to promote economic growth in the developing world through "trade, not aid." Since its inception, the program has been a small but important part of the U.S. development assistance strat- Some developing countries recently lost their preferential status all together, at least for certain products. In October of 2005, the United States launched a comprehensive review of the GSP program, seeking to determine whether the eligibility of beneficiaries should be changed. According to U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab, the review was initiated at the request of Congressmen who were concerned that the bulk of GSP benefits go to a few countries, while other developing countries were not trading much under the program.
As discussed below, the changes Congress enacted to the GSP program in December 2006
attempted to address these concerns by limiting competitive need limitation waivers. . 3 Previous econometric studies of "preference erosion" have predicted that reductions in MFN tariff rates, or removal of preferential programs all together, will significantly decrease exports from developing countries. Subramanian (2003) , for example, predicts that trade liberalization in the United States, European Union, Japan, and Canada will result in a 1.7 percent loss of export revenue accruing to the least developed countries; Alexandraki and Lankes (2004) similarly find this liberalization would result in a 0.5 to 1.2 percent reduction in the value of exports from middle-income countries.
In contrast, recent trade statistics suggest that the erosion of tariff preferences has not had as big an impact on developing countries as one might expect. While the simple average U.S. tariff rate fell from 4.3 to 3.0 percent between 1997 and 2005, the share of U.S. imports from developing countries actually increased by 13.9 percent, from 11.3 to 13.0 percent, as illustrated in Figure [2] . These aggregate statistics suggest that the impact of preference erosion on developing countries deserves further study.
This paper analyzes the impact of U.S. tariff reductions on imports from the developing world using a panel of U.S. import data from 157 trade partners in over 4,700 six-digit harmonized system (HS) code products between the years of 1997 and 2005. Estimating a model of bilateral trade flows in which the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign of products impacted by the new rules may increase in the future. 3 Specifically, imports from countries paying normal U.S. tariff rates, particularly China, Malaysia, Taiwan and Korea, grew 5.8 percent in 2000 after the 2.1 percent tariff was removed on telephones. At the same time, products from GSP-eligible countries, particularly Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, fell 121 percent.
varieties is allowed to differ from the elasticity between foreign varieties, I find that reductions in preference margins will significantly diminish imports of some products, particularly from lower-middle and low income countries. For example, a one percent reduction in the U.S. tariff on a product that is currently imported duty-free from developing countries will decrease imports of that product from lower-middle countries, such as Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines, by an average of 2.6 percent. Low-income countries such as India will experience a much smaller reduction in exports to the United States of 0.4 percent from this same tariff reduction.
As one might expect, the complete elimination of preference margins due to recent changes in the GSP program will have a much more dramatic impact on U.S. imports from effected developing countries. However, because many products produced by developing countries fail to qualify for preferential tariffs, a gradual reduction in all U.S. tariff rates is expected to have only a modest impact on trade flows from developing countries.
U.S. Preferential Tariffs
In 1976, the United States eliminated tariffs on approximately 3,000 eight-digit HS tariffline items for 138 beneficiary developing countries and territories under the GSP program.
Today, duty-free entry is available for approximately 3,400 products from 134 beneficiary countries and territories. 4 Countries are graduated from the GSP program when the country's GNP per capita exceeds the threshold for high-income countries as determined by the 4 To be eligible for duty-free treatment under the GSP program at least 35 percent of the value of product must be produced in the beneficiary country. Each year the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) accepts petitions to add or eliminate eligible products and countries. While certain products are statutorily banned from eligibility from the GSP program, including textiles, footwear and other "import-sensitive" products, an additional 1,450 products are designated eligible for the GSP program for least developed beneficiary countries and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) expands GSP-benefits for countries in sub-Saharan Africa to include an additional 1,200 products, including many of the import-sensitive products statutorily banned from the basic GSP program. Leading imports under the GSP program include oil and gas products, jewelry, and motor vehicle parts.
Literature Review
Since the passage of the GSP program, several methods have been used to estimate the trade and welfare effects of preferential trade programs such as the GSP program, as well as the degree of preference erosion that has occurred due to trade liberalization over the past 30 years. Most methods can fall into one of two categories: ex ante studies which try to study the potential impact of the program prior to its implementation and ex post studies which try to isolate the effect of the preferential tariff treatment on actual trade flows.
One of the earliest studies, Baldwin and Murray (1977) , estimated the impact of the GSP program using a partial-equilibrium model in which imports from beneficiary countries are considered imperfect substitutes for products from industrialized countries, and production from all countries is characterized by perfectly elastic supply curves. effect that occurs due to tariffs and a tariff-diversion effect that occurs due to preferential trade programs. This tariff diversion effect measures the degree to which developing countries experience an increase in exports due to preference programs such as the GSP program.
Using this model, the authors estimated that preferential tariff programs increase U.S. im-ports from LDC countries by 10.5 percent, or approximately $0.4 billion. Because the bulk of the increase in exports is due to a small subset of products (half of the estimated import expansion in the United States from preference programs is in the mineral products sector), countries that produce these products benefit much more from U.S. preferences than others.
This paper builds upon the work described above by exploring recent complaints that the bulk of benefits from preferential trade programs accrue to a small subset of countries.
Specifically, I estimate a model similar to Haveman and Shatz (2004) that allows some countries to benefit from preferential tariff access more than other countries based on the country's level of development. The results suggest that preferential tariff programs benefit lower-middle income countries much more than those countries at other levels of development;
these countries may experience a significant decrease in exports of certain products to the United States due to preference erosion.
Empirical Model and Data Sources
Like customs unions, part of the growth in imports that occurs due to preferential trade programs like the GSP program is caused by "trade diversion." In other words, the tariff reduction on products under the GSP program reduces the U.S. price of products from eligible beneficiary countries; as a result, imports from developing countries increase as U.S.
consumers both increase consumption and substitute products produced by the developing world for domestically-produced goods (trade-creation) and other industrialized countries 
In this equation, E j , M i , and H k are exporter, importer and product-specific fixed effects.
The matrix x ij includes a number of explanatory variables that are commonly used in gravityequation specifications of bilateral trade, including the distance between the two countries and whether the two countries share a common border and language.
The main variables of interest, however, both in the Haveman, Nair-Reichert and Thursby Countries that are awarded preferential tariff treatment, including developing countries and members of free trade agreements, should experience an increase in trade due to their now lower prices compared to other trading partners. In other words, the trade-diversion effect, T ARDiv k ij , captures the extent to which the preferential tariffs lead to a diversion of imports 7 The Haveman, Nair-Reichert, and Thursby (2000) specification also includes a number of non-tariff barrier variables. 8 As noted in Haveman, Nair-Reichert and Thursby (2000), using the value of imports as a weightingvariable to calculate the trade-weighted average tariff, T AR k i , could result in simultaneity bias during estimation. I follow Haveman and Shatz (2004) in using imports at the five-digit HS level as the weighting variable when constructing trade-weighted average tariff rates to minimize this problem.
from one country to another, preferred country. This variable is measured as the difference between the tariff paid by exporter j and the average tariffs paid by all other exporters.
Because a high relative tariff would divert trade from an exporter, the coefficient on this variable is expected to be negative. The coefficient on T ARDiv k ij , β 3 , can be interpreted as the elasticity of substitution between foreign varieties of the same good. As explained in Haveman, Nair-Reichert and Thursby (2000), a higher degree of substitution between foreign varieties than between domestic and foreign varieties, or β 3 < β 2 , indicates a domestic bias in consumption as well as tremendous potential for trade-diversion.
The final tariff variable included in Haveman, Nair-Reichert and Thursby (2000) is the tariff compression effect, T ARComp k ij . Intuitively, because of the fixed cost of importing from each country, imports will likely be compressed into a smaller number of suppliers than would be ideal absent these fixed costs. In other words, the fixed costs will compress trade flows to a smaller number of large supplier. Haveman, Nair-Reichert and Thursby (2000) hypothesize that this trade compression effect will become more severe as the average tariff increases because the larger tariff will reduce consumer expenditures on imports; if a disproportionately high share of consumer expenditures on imports from one or more of the smaller suppliers is going towards paying for fixed costs, then the supplier will be dropped.
I measure the tariff compression effect as the product of the average tariff rate for product k and exporter j s export potential, or the value of a country's total exports to the United States at the four-digit North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) level. account for unobserved characteristics of the importer or the product that may effect import levels using either fixed effects or random effects. Failure to control for these country-and product-specific effects may be causing significant omitted variable bias in their estimates.
I instead estimate the model using a first-difference panel estimator. The first-difference estimator and the fixed-effect estimator used in the original Haveman, Nair-Reichert and Thursby (2000) study are both unbiased and consistent; in fact, with only two time periods the two estimators will result in identical parameter estimates. With more than two time periods, the fixed-effect estimator is more efficient under the assumption that the errors are serially uncorrelated, while the first-difference estimator is more efficient when the errors follow a random walk. Tests for serial correlation described in Wooldridge (2002; pages 282-283) for each of the four-digit NAICS industries indicate that the data in all but one industry is characterized by serial correlation.
10 Note that all non-time varying variables, including those incorporated into the matrix x ij described above, will fall out of the model using a first-difference estimator and, thus, cannot be estimated.
Finally, given that the majority of benefits under the GSP program are collected by a handful of developing countries, I am particularly interested in to what degree the tradediversion effect is stronger or weaker depending on the income level of the exporting country.
The Haveman and Shatz (2004) model assumes that the elasticity of substitution between
foreign varieties, β 3 , will be the same across all countries. I instead assume that this elasticity of substitution depends on the level of development of the country. In other words,
U.S. consumers may consider a blouse from two high-income countries such as Italy and
France more similar than a blouse from one of these high-income countries and a low-income developing country such as Bangladesh. As a result, the degree of trade diversion associated with a preferential tariff will depend on the level of development of the beneficiary country. 
where T t denotes year dummy variables that are intended to capture any macroeconomic trends in imports, ∆ denotes the change in the variable of interest between period t and t − 1, and l indexes the income-groups.
10 Industry-specific test statistics are available from the author upon request. It should be noted that the regressand in this research is total U.S. imports of a specific product from a specific country, not imports under a specific import program. Although a country may be eligible for GSP preferences, producers may choose to instead ship products under an alternative duty-free program, especially because the continued viability of the GSP program was uncertain during this sample period. Moreover, products from eligible countries may be shipped without tariff preferences if the shipper is unfamiliar with the GSP program or the product fails to meet U.S. rules of origin requirements. The dataset assigns 11 Ad valorem MFN tariffs were estimated for those products with specific tariffs using the reported total duties collect and dutiable import value for each product from the U.S. Census Bureau. Similarly, ad valorem preferential tariffs were estimated for those products with specific preferential tariffs using the reported total duties collected and dutiable import value for the product from the country in question.
the lowest eligible tariff rate to all imports of a particular product from a particular country, even though some of the products may be imported under a higher tariff rate.
Results
Estimates from a baseline specification in which the trade diversion effect is assumed to be equal across all country groups are presented in Table [ Finally, there is only weak evidence that tariff preferences successfully increase trade from low-income countries, despite the fact that India is one of the leading beneficiaries of the GSP program. The average impact of a 1 percent decrease in the preference margin is significantly below that for lower-middle income countries-resulting in a 2.5 percent decrease in trade flows-and the econometric estimates suggest that tariff preferences result in significant increases in trade flows from low-income countries in only 10.6 percent of manufacturing industries. The average impact is primarily being driven by strong significant coefficients in the primary metal industries.
Another way of interpreting the results is that the degree of trade diversion-or the degree to which U.S. consumers substitute products from beneficiary countries for imports from alternative suppliers-is highest when the preferential tariffs are awarded to lower-middle income countries. This may be due to the fact that the types of products produced by low-income countries, for example, are only produced by the least developed countries, all of which are awarded preferential tariff treatment, thus no trade-diversion occurs. Canada is one of the few high-income countries that have been awarded preferential tariffs by the United
States, but as a bordering nation Canada is also a natural trading partner for the United
States thus no trade-diversion takes place from the preferential tariffs. In contrast, the results suggest that preferential tariffs significantly divert trade to lower-middle income countries like Thailand and Indonesia; GSP-eligible products imported from these lower-middle income countries may have otherwise been imported from upper-middle or high income countries that are subject to MFN tariff rates such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, or countries within the European Union.
The parameter estimates suggest that reductions of U.S. MFN tariffs on GSP-eligible products will have a significant impact on trade flows from lower-middle income developing countries. Combining the average trade reduction and trade diversion coefficient for lower-middle income countries, or those developing countries estimated to be the biggest beneficiaries of preferential tariff status, a one percent reduction in the U.S. MFN tariff on a GSP-eligible product will reduce U.S. imports from these countries by an average of 2.6 percent. Similar calculations suggest that low income countries will experience a lower reduction of just 0.4 percent, while U.S. imports from upper-middle income countries will actually increase by an average of 0.5 percent.
The large decrease in preference margins that some countries will experience under the recent changes in the GSP program will have a much larger impact on imports from certain industries and countries due to the dramatic increase in tariffs these countries will experience.
According to the U.S. Trade Representative's office, low income and lower-middle income GSP beneficiaries will be hardest hit by the recent changes in the U.S. 
Estimated Impact of a Reduction of U.S. Tariff Preferences
In order to estimate the impact of further reductions in U.S. MFN tariffs on developing countries, I use the parameter estimates discussed above to simulate the impact of a one percent reduction in U.S. MFN tariffs on a subset of manufacturing industries in 2005.
Specifically, I simulate the impact of a one percent reduction of all tariffs, not just those products eligible for the GSP program, in the 52 four-digit NAICS industries in which I
found at least one significant parameter estimate during the estimation of Equation [2] .
These industries, which are listed in Although many developing countries will experience a slight decrease in trade flows to the United States following a reduction in U.S. MFN tariffs, the overall negative impact is relatively modest. In total, low to upper-middle income countries that benefit from preferential tariffs are expected to experience a decrease in U.S. exports of just $8.0 million, or 0.004 percent of estimated trade flows. This modest effect is primarily due to the fact that many of the leading products produced by developing countries, such as apparel and agricultural products, are excluded from GSP eligibility and tend to have some of the highest MFN tariffs in the United States; both GSP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are expected to significantly benefit from a reduction in the U.S. tariffs imposed on these products. However, I also find that gradual reduction in all U.S. tariff rates will have only a modest negative impact on imports from most developing countries, a finding which seems to be confirmed by recent trade flow statistics. This is likely due to the fact that developing countries will benefit as tariffs on some of the most important developing-country products which are not eligible for the GSP program, such as apparel, are reduced. 
